If two stimuli need different times to be processed, this difference should in principle be reflected both by response times (RT) and by judgments of their temporal order (TOJ). However, several dissociations have been reported between RT and TOJ, e.g., RT is more affected than TOJ when stimulus intensity decreases. One account for these dissociations is to assume differences in the allocation of attention induced by the two tasks. To test this hypothesis, different distributions of attention were induced in the present study between two stimulus positions (above and below fixation). Only bright stimuli appeared in one position and either bright or dim stimuli in the other. In the two RT experiments, participants had to respond to every stimulus appearing in one of the two positions. Reaction times to bright stimuli were faster when they appeared in the position where dim stimuli were likely to occur. This finding suggests that the allocation of attention was adapted to the asymmetrical arrangement of stimuli, not suggested by explicit instruction. In the two TOJ experiments, the temporal order of stimuli appearing in the two positions had to be judged. Although bright stimuli appearing at the bright-and-dim location were judged to be earlier, this effect was small and insignificant. Further, the intensity dissociation between RT and TOJ was insensitive to random vs blockwise presentations of intensities, therefore was not modified by attentional preferences. Thus, asymmetrical arrangement of stimuli has an impact on the allocation of attention, but only in the RT task. Therefore dissociations between TOJ and response times cannot be accounted for by an attentional bias in the TOJ task but probably by different use of temporal information in the two tasks.
INTRODUCTION
Selective attention consists in choosing one sensory channel for cognitive processing when multiple channels are available. Attended stimuli are more efficiently processed by the cognitive system, and this increased efficiency is reached at the expense of other stimuli. There are several measures to characterize the effect of attention. These are sensitivity (e.g., Bashinski, & Bacharach, 1980) , resolution (e.g., Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989) , and perceptual latency (Eriksen & Hoffman 1972; Posner, 1980) . Nakayama and Mackeben (1989) have shown that there are two components of visual attention which differ in their underlying mechanisms and temporal characteristics. These are transient and sustained components. Both lead to improvement of performance. The transient component is triggered by a lateral cue, has fast rise and fall times, and is not subject to voluntary control. In the typical experimental situation, a visual cue is presented beforehand to indicate the position of a target stimulus. Under such circumstances, perceptual latency is shorter in the cued position than in uncued positions both when measured by reaction time (e.g., Hawkins, Shafto, & Richardson, 1988) and by temporal order judgment (Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993; Stelmach, & Herdman, 1991) . This kind of orienting of visual attention has a tendency to fade out when the time between cue and target stimuli increases. However, daily experience suggests that attention can be driven voluntarily and this kind of orienting of attention was also proven experimentally (e.g., Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) . This is what Nakayama and Mackeben (1989) call the sustained component of attention.
Since the main goal of the attention mechanism is selection of information sources to improve performance, it may be assumed that any inequality in the visual field leads to a corresponding inequality in the distribution of attention if this leads to improved performance. This assumption is of some importance for the problem of dissociations between reaction time and judgment of temporal order (TOJ). TOJ is considered a reasonable method for estimating sensory latency (for reviews see Sternberg & Knoll 1973; Jaśkowski, 1996 Jaśkowski, , 1999 . The logic underlying the method is quite straightforward. When two stimuli, which differ in their sensory latencies, were simultaneously presented to participants, they would be perceived as asynchronous because, due to different latencies, they reach the brain asynchronously. So, when the stimulus of longer latency is presented ∆L ms sooner, where ∆L corresponds to the latency difference, both stimuli should reach the brain simultaneously, and participants should perceive them as simultaneous. The stimulus onset asynchrony for which participants view both stimuli as simultaneous is called the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) and is considered a measure of relative sensory latency.
Recently, some objections were raised against this simple logic. They issue mainly from direct comparisons of the latency measured by this method and by simple reaction time (RT). It was shown that RT usually underwent larger changes than PSS when sensory latency was changed by means of manipulation of an independent variable (for reviews see Jaśkowski, 1996; Jaśkowski, 1999) . Such a dissociation was revealed for variables like stimulus intensity (e.g., Roufs, 1974) , light adaptation level (Menendez & Lit, 1983) , spatial frequencies (Tappe, Niepel, & Neumann, 1994) , stimulus modality (Rutschmann & Link, 1964; Neumann, Koch, Niepel, & Tappe, 1992) , and wavelength (cf. Bowen, 1981; Nissen & Pokorny, 1977) . This discrepant behavior of the two measures was called ''dissociation'' (Neumann et al., 1992) . Jaśkowski (1996) pointed out that no hypothesis proposed so far to account for these dissociations has been fully supported by empirical results. Roufs (1974) was the first to show that the changes of PSS for two visual stimuli were smaller than those of RT when the intensity of one of the stimuli was manipulated. This result was replicated by Menendez and Lit (1983) and Jaśkowski (1992) . This discrepancy, which is here referred to as ''intensity dissociation,'' following Neumann et al. (1992) , might be explained by an attentional bias, as was proposed by Sternberg and Knoll (1973) , as an account for other dissociations of this kind. Indeed, in all three papers devoted to the problem of intensity dissociation, in the TOJ task the position of the low-and high-intensity stimulus was known to participants before the trial. Therefore, since the two stimuli compete for attention participants might focus their attention on the low-intensity stimulus to avoid overlooking it. So it may be due to attentional bias that the latency of the high-intensity stimulus is delayed with respect to a situation of symmetrical distribution of attention. Such an attention bias does not occur in an RT task since usually only one stimulus is presented in a trial and participants may focus their entire attention on it.
The present-study was intended to investigate whether this attentional bias indeed makes any contribution to the intensity dissociation. In other words, the question is studied whether there is an attentional bias toward the position where the lowintensity stimulus is expected in a TOJ experiment in which two stimuli of different intensities are presented. A second, related question is whether the asymmetrical arrangement of the visual field can introduce a differential attention distribution even without any explicit instruction and/or cueing.
EXPERIMENT 1
First, the potential attentional bias was checked in an RT experiment which mimicked the TOJ situation. The earlier studies, mentioned above, had compared the TOJ task, where necessarily two stimuli were presented in each trial, to the RT task where necessarily only one stimulus was presented in each trial. (If two stimuli were presented in the RT task, RT would, of course, reflect their combined effect, e.g., Miller, 1982 , and moreover the RTs to the two stimuli could not be compared to each other.) Being presented simultaneously, the two stimuli in the TOJ task were necessarily presented at different positions in space, which is another difference to the RT task. To study the effects of this difference on RT, visual stimuli could appear in one of two positions in the present experiment. In one position (B), only bright stimuli appeared, while in the other position (BD) bright and dim stimuli alternated randomly. Thus, participants awaited the dim stimuli only in one of the two positions. We expected that they would focus their attention on this position. If so, RTs to the bright stimuli should be longer when presented at the B location than when presented at the BD location.
We expected a larger spontaneous bias of attention when the intensity of the dim stimulus was smaller, as in such a situation the possibility of overlooking the stimulus was becoming larger. Therefore, we employed a procedure by means of which we could keep the intensity of the dim stimulus near threshold level individually for each participant despite any adaptation to the dark.
Method
Participants. Five participants, ages 21 to 39 years, took part in the experiment. They were all recruited from the student population of the Medical University of Lübeck. They had normal vision by self-report and were paid 15 DM for their participation in Experiments 1 and 4.
Apparatus. The participant's head was positioned 54 cm from the screen and supported by a head-and-chest-stabilizing frame (Permobil Meditech). Participants viewed a red fixation point at the level of their eyes. The stimuli could appear 2 cm above or below fixation. They were produced by two yellow LEDs driven by a computer via a D/A converter. Luminance of bright stimuli was 36 cd/m 2 . Dim stimuli had near-threshold luminance as described below. Stimulus duration was 100 ms.
Eye-movement control was provided by the Ober2 infrared system. Participants responded to the stimuli by pressing the left mouse button with their preferred hand. Stimulus timing and data acquisition were under computer control.
Procedure. The sessions were divided into two blocks whose order alternated randomly between participants. The BD (bright and dim) location was above fixation in one block and below in the other. Either block consisted of 100 trials. Each participant took part in five sessions on 5 different days. The first session was treated as training, and data from this session were not included in the analysis. Every session started with a 10-min period of adaptation to the dark.
Before each block the participants were informed which was the BD location. They were instructed to respond to every flash irrespective of its position as fast as possible while keeping their gaze on the fixation point. They were also told that their eye movements would be recorded. Short blinks (5 ϫ 50 ms) of the fixation point began each trial. Then, after an interval which was the sum of 1000 ms and an interval sampled from an exponential distribution with mean of 1000 ms, the stimulus appeared either below or above the fixation point with equal probability. If appearing at the BD location, the stimulus was either bright or dim (50% probability each). The bright stimuli had the same intensity in both positions. Intensity of the dim stimuli was kept at near-threshold level by the up-and-down method: Intensity was increased after one missed flash (i.e., when RT Ͼ800 ms) and decreased after two correct responses. The resulting a priori convergence probability of visibility was 0.707. The next trial started 1.5 s later.
Data analysis. Only RTs to bright stimuli were analyzed. Responses made with latencies shorter than 150 ms or before stimulus presentation were labeled as premature and were excluded from analysis. Responses with latencies longer than 500 ms were not taken into account, either. The eye-movement records were analyzed offline to identify all trials in which there was a vertical saccade greater than 1°toward the BD location between the warning signal (blinking of the fixation point) and the end of stimulus (1°constitutes approximately half the distance to the target). All such trials were excluded from analysis.
RTs were averaged over trials separately for either position of the actually presented stimulus (above vs below fixation) and for blocks with the BD location above vs below fixation. These mean RTs were subjected to a univariate analysis of variance with two within-subjects factors: block (BD location above vs below fixation) and actual stimulus position (at BD location vs at B location), with actual position being the test factor.
Results and Discussion
Three percent of trials had to be eliminated due to vertical saccades and 1.3% due to too-early or too-late responding. Thus, although only reaction times to stimuli of identical intensities were compared, RTs were shorter to stimuli presented in the position where the near-threshold stimuli were expected. This result is exactly as predicted by the hypothesis stated in the Introduction, where we assumed that participants preferred to direct their attention to the BD location in order to avoid overlooking the dim, near-threshold stimuli. If so, this finding lends additional plausibility to the hypothesis that such an effect may occur in judgment of temporal order and may, at least partially, be responsible for the intensity dissociation described in the Introduction.
This hypothesis is tested in Experiments 3 and 4. Before testing this hypothesis we have to consider the possibility that the obtained effect results from the special arrangement of stimulation. Therefore, we address the issue of intensity manipulation further in Experiment 2. Another possible objection concerns stimulus probability. One can argue that RTs to bright stimuli at the BD location are reduced by their diminished probability of occurrence. If the dim stimulus is sometimes not perceived, the actual probability of stimulus occurrence will decrease for the BD location. It is, however, well established that RT is longer when probability of stimulus occurrence decreases (Näätänen, 1972; Näätänen & Koskinen, 1975) , so this effect should lead to delays of RT at the BD location. This means that the effect of attention bias on RT was probably even larger than that found in this Experiment, being presumably reduced by the effect of probability of stimulus occurrence, as these two factors work in opposite directions.
EXPERIMENT 2
If the effect found in Experiment 1 is valid only for extremely low intensities, its significance for explaining the intensity dissociation would be very limited. Possibly, attention will not be focused on the position where the low-intensity stimulus is expected when suprathreshold stimuli are used, as the possibility of missing dim stimuli will then be reduced. This problem is addressed in Experiment 2 which is identical to Experiment 1 except that three different intensities were used for the dim stimuli in different blocks.
Method
Participants. Four naive participants plus the first author took part. They were aged 24 to 41 years and were all recruited from the student population or were staff members of the Medical University of Lübeck. They had normal vision by self-report and were paid (excluding the first author) 15 DM for their participation in the experiment.
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1, except that eye movements were not controlled.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that the dim stimuli had three different levels of intensity, 2.41, 0.33, and 0.07 cd/m 2 . The luminance of the bright stimulus was as before. The sessions consisted of three blocks whose order alternated randomly between participants. In each block the dim stimulus was fixed to one of the three levels. Every block consisted of two parts of 50 trials each. In one part the BD location was above fixation, in the other below. The order of these two parts alternated randomly. Each participant took part in five sessions on 5 different days.
Before each block the participants were informed which block would be presented. They were instructed to respond to every flash irrespective of its position as fast as possible while keeping their gaze at the fixation point.
Data analysis. Premature and late responses were excluded from analysis as in Experiment 1. Again, mean RTs were analyzed for bright stimuli only. The ANOVA had the same two factors as in Experiment 1 (block, i.e., BD location above vs. below fixation, and actual stimulus position, i.e., at BD location vs at B location) plus the factor of Intensity of the dim stimulus. Having three levels, effects of this factor were corrected by Greenhouse-Geisser's ε.
Results and Discussion
As displayed in conclude that the difference between RTs to bright stimuli at BD and B locations reflects a shift of attention, not an artifact of using near-threshold stimuli, because the effect occurs not only if the dim stimuli are near-threshold but also if they are well visible.
EXPERIMENT 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that participants focus their attention on the position where the dim stimulus is expected when two stimuli of different intensities compete for attention. Such a competition is likely to occur when in TOJ experiments two stimuli of different intensities are used. These stimuli are displayed in close temporal proximity and the participants' task is to say which one was presented first. As argued in the Introduction, a bias of attention might account for the intensity dissociation because this bias would occur in the TOJ experiment but not in the usual RT experiment where only one stimulus would be presented in each trial. Thus, Experiment 3 and 4 were TOJ experiments. Experiment 3 made a direct comparison between RT and TOJ for different suprathreshold intensities with bright and dim stimuli presented either blockwise or randomly at upper and lower positions. Since in random presentation of luminances participants were not able to predict the location of dim stimuli, no attentional bias was expected and therefore no (or at least a smaller) intensity dissociation. However, when the location of the dim stimulus was confined to one position, the attentional bias should occur, leading possibly to the intensity dissociation.
Method

Participants
Another five naive participants were recruited from the student population of the Medical University of Lübeck. They were aged 23 to 35 years, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision by self-report, and were paid 30 DM for their participation.
Apparatus
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Every session consisted of three conditions that were made up of several blocks which were randomly intermixed: One RT part and two temporal order judgment parts.
The reaction time part was performed for stimuli of four luminances (bright: 36 cd/m 2 ; dim: 2.41 and 0.33; and 0.07 cd/m 2 ). Differing from Experiments 1 and 2, these stimuli were presented in separate blocks. In any block, the stimuli were presented in a fixed position, above or below the fixation point. For one participant and for a given session, the bright (B) stimuli, which we refer to as reference stimuli, were presented in one position, e.g., above fixation, while the stimuli of other intensities (D) were presented in the other position, e.g., below fixation, in order to resemble the blockwise arrangement of the TOJ task. The position of the BD stimuli was randomly assigned from session to session and from participant to participant. Partici-pants were informed before each block about the intensity and position of the stimuli. Each block consisted of 50 trials.
Temporal order judgment. In each trial, a B and a D stimulus were presented in close temporal proximity, with their stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) as the test variable (see below). One stimulus was presented above fixation, the other below. In the random condition, D stimuli appeared either above or below the fixation point in random order. In blockwise arrangement, the position of B and D stimuli was fixed in one block; for a given participant, the position and order of intensities were alternated exactly as in the reaction-time part. In every case, the participants' task was to say which stimulus of the pair was presented first, by pressing the left or right key of the computer mouse. For each arrangement, TOJ was measured in three blocks which differed in intensity of the dim flashes. One block consisted of 100 trials; five sessions were carried out for every participant.
To adapt the delays inserted between the flash onsets (SOA) to the participant's level of performance and thus to optimally determine the psychometric function we used the method introduced by Jaśkowski, Jaroszyk, and Hojan-Jezierska (1990). The SOA was not taken at random from a predetermined assemble (the ''constant stimulus'' method) but was determined by the up-and-down method (Levitt, 1971 ) with three strategies randomly interwoven. In the first strategy, SOA was increased by 20 ms after every ''upper first'' response and decreased by 20 ms after every ''lower first'' response. In the second (third) strategy, SOA was increased (decreased) by 20 ms after two consecutive ''upper first'' (''lower first'') responses and decreased (increased) 20 ms after every ''lower first'' (''upper first'') response. The three strategies settled, therefore, on 50, 29.3, or 70.75% of ''correct'' responses on the psychometric function (Levitt, 1971 ). We did not look for these settled values but rather counted all responses for a given SOA and plotted the ratio of one response to the total responses as a function of SOA, resulting in the psychometric function. This is a self-adaptive method and, moreover, allows determination of the whole psychometric function (like the constant stimulus method), although the numbers of stimuli for different SOAs are not equal, being usually smaller for the tails of the curve.
The B stimulus can evoke an aftereffect which masks the following stimulus in the same position. So, it may introduce a problem when a random arrangement is used: the B stimulus might cause an aftereffect at its position, temporarily reducing the observer's sensitivity to that position in the next trial. While this effect is probably insignificant for stimuli well above threshold (Menendez & Lit, 1983 ) the latency of a following D stimulus could be significantly lengthened. To avoid this effect, the LEDs above and below fixation were flashed simultaneously with the warning signal before every stimulus pair, the luminance of the flashes being as high as the B imperative stimuli. This way, the adaptation state in both positions was equalized before each trial.
Statistical Evaluation
TOJ task. The participants' responses from all five sessions were pooled for every 20-ms SOA-bin, resulting in psychometric functions (probability of ''upper first'' response at each SOA) for each comparison of the bright reference stimuli to the three D stimuli, separately for random and blockwise conditions. The mean SOA values and the median SOA values (point of subjective simultaneity, PSS) associated with a given psychometric function were calculated according to the SpearmanKärber method (Spearman, 1908; Epstein & Churchman, 1944; Sternberg, Knoll, & Zukofsky 1982) , whereby the psychometric function is regarded as a cumulative distribution function. Since psychometric functions sometimes do not comply with the restriction of monotonicity, the monotonizing procedure of Ayer, Brunk, Ewing, Reid, and Silverman (1955) was applied. For comparison with the changes of RTs the mean SOA values were entered into the ANOVAs.
RT task. Since the result of the TOJ task is a measure of difference between the B and the D stimuli (the SOA at which both stimuli appear to have equal onset) such a difference measure should also be the result of the RT task to enable direct comparison between tasks. Therefore, differences were computed between the mean RTs to each D stimulus and to the bright reference stimulus.
ANOVAs were computed on these difference values. One ANOVA compared the RT task and the blockwise TOJ task. The factors were task (RT vs TOJ) and intensity of the D stimulus (three levels). The second ANOVA compared the blockwise and random TOJ condition with the factors condition (blockwise, random) and intensity of the D stimulus.
Results
The mean values of the TOJ psychometric functions and of RT differences (dim minus bright) are displayed as a function of stimulus intensity in Fig. 3 . Evidently, the differences of reaction time were overwhelmingly larger than those of TOJ latency for random presentation of intensities intensity on TOJ is due to attentional bias in favor of the position of the D stimulus, the effect of intensity should be much more similar to the RT task if the D position is not fixed, i.e., in the random condition. However, as is evident from Fig. 3 , the two conditions did not differ from each other [condition: F(1, 4) Ͻ 1.0; condition x intensity: F(2, 8) Ͻ 1.0]. There were also no systematic divergences of latencyintensity curves for the two ways of presentations in individual participants. This finding shows that the intensity dissociation cannot be explained in terms of an attentional shift.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 3 had provided strong evidence that the intensity dissociation between RT and TOJ cannot be explained by the attentional bias. However, apart from this question of how to explain the dissociation, the question still remains whether such an attentional bias as demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 2 for the RT task may occur in the TOJ task as well. That is, even if the dissociation cannot be explained by attentional bias, does an adequate hypothesis about the processes involved in TOJ have to take attentional factors into account or not? In order to check this question, TOJ functions have to be investigated for two equally bright stimuli, like in Experiment 1. (This was not done in Experiment 3, where TOJ functions were investigated in the usual way, for a B and a D stimulus.) Therefore, Experiment 4 was a parallel study to Experiment 1, using the same stimuli and the same participants (plus one more). Different from Experiment 1, two stimuli were presented in each trial, to be judged in a TOJ task, but like in Experiment 1, only bright stimuli were presented in one position (B) and either bright or dim stimuli in the other position (B&D). (This differs from Experiment 3, where one of the two stimuli was always dim.) The participants' task was to indicate which stimulus appeared first, no matter if the stimuli were equally bright or not. We expected that the psychometric functions would differ between the B&D and the B position even if only pairs of equally bright stimuli are considered. If the B&D position would attract attention, there should be more ''first'' responses for that position for a given SOA.
Method
Participants
Six naive participants participated. Five of them were the same as in Experiment 1. They were ages 24 to 39 years and were all recruited from the student population or staff members of the Medical University of Lübeck. They had normal vision by self-report and were paid 15 DM for their participation in Experiments 1 and 4. The sixth participant (CV) was not paid for his participation in this experiment, being a friend of the authors.
Apparatus
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Eye-movement recordings were provided by the Ober 2 system, as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The first session for a given participant was a training session and the results obtained were excluded from further analysis.
The sessions were subdivided into two blocks: in one block, the BD position was above the fixation point and in the other block below. The order of the blocks was randomized and participants were told what the BD position was. In every trial a pair of stimuli was presented: one above and one below the fixation point. The participants' task was to indicate by pressing the left or right button of the computer mouse which stimulus had appeared first. Participants could also press the middle mouse button when they saw one B stimulus only, i.e., when they had not perceived the dim stimulus of the pair. Intensity of the D stimuli was controlled by the up-anddown procedure as described under the Methods of Experiment 1: intensity was decreased after two consecutive responses of ''upper first'' or ''lower first'' and increased after every response of ''I saw only the high-intensity stimulus.''
The SOAs of the two stimuli were adapted by the same interwoven three strategies as in Experiment 3. In addition to Experiment 3, where only B&D pairs had been presented, the strategies evolved separately for the pairs of stimuli with B-D and with B-B intensities.
There were two blocks in every session. In one block there were 100 trials in which B&D was above fixation and 100 trials in which B&D was below fixation. The order of blocks was randomized. Five sessions were carried out for every participant. Every session started with a 10-min period of adaptation to the dark.
The order of Experiments 1 and 4 was randomized for the five participants who also took part in Experiment 1.
Data analysis. As in Experiment 1, the eye-movement records were analyzed offline to exclude those trials in which there were vertical saccades toward the B&D location between the warning signal (blinking of the fixation point) and the offset of stimuli.
The participants' responses from all five sessions were pooled for every 20-ms SOA-bin and the psychometric functions of judging ''upper position was first'' were computed for the two types of blocks separately (B&D-above-fixation and B&D-below-fixation blocks). The mean and the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS), i.e., the median, associated with a given psychometric function were calculated as in Experiment 3.
Mean and median values were subjected to an analysis of variance with the one within-subjects factor: block (B&D position above fixation vs B&D position below fixation). Any effect of attention on the ''upper first'' judgment should be reflected in a main effect of this factor.
Results
On average, the effect of B&D position was very small (about 6 ms as measured by the mean and 11 ms as measured by PSS) and insignificant [F(1, 5) ϭ 0.246]. The psychometric functions pooled for all sessions and participants are displayed in Fig. 4 , for the upper and lower B&D position. As can be seen, they overlap almost perfectly, i.e., the judgment ''upper stimulus was first'' for two bright stimuli was hardly affected by the fact that dim stimuli could appear at one of the two locations. The average effect of 6 ms was much smaller than in Experiment 1 (52 ms) and insignificant. Thus, presenting the bright stimuli at a location where D stimuli may also appear causes no bias of temporal order judgment.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Attentional Bias as a Possible Explanation for the Intensity Dissociation between RT and TOJ
Attention is one of the perceptual mechanisms which is provided to improve performance. So it seems reasonable to assume that an asymmetrical arrangement in the visual field might result in asymmetrical distribution of attention if improvement of performance is to be expected. For example, if stimuli of different intensities appear in two different locations the participants may tend to turn their attention to the dim stimuli to avoid overlooking them. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 clearly indicate that, indeed, RTs to stimuli presented in the position where both bright and dim stimuli might appear are shorter than to those in the position where only high-intensity stimuli appeared. We interpret this finding as evidence in favor of the hypothesis that such an asymmetry in the visual field is really able to change the distribution of attention. We also showed (Experiment 2) that the shift appears not only for extremely weak, near-threshold stimuli for which the danger of overlooking really exists but also for stimuli of intensities well above threshold and that the shift gradually decreases when the intensity difference gets smaller. These findings are hard to explain by the assumption that the attention shift takes place only if the stimuli presented could be overlooked. Rather, the participants seem to improve the overall performance, i.e., to reduce the overall reaction time. This latter conclusion, however, requires further experimental support.
The attentional bias as revealed by reaction time in Experiments 1 and 2 might contribute to the overall understanding of mechanisms of allocation of attention because usually attention is manipulated by cues or by explicit instruction (cf. the Intro-duction), while we showed here that attention may be allocated within the visual field depending on participants' strategies. Experimental situations, however, in which such an attentional bias may occur are rather unusual. One situation with such an asymmetry is the TOJ paradigm where two stimuli are presented at separate positions, and where the effect of intensity on TOJ has been investigated in tasks in which the position of low-intensity stimuli was known to the participants (Roufs, 1974; Menendez & Lit, 1983; Jaśkowski, 1992) . TOJ latencies between bright and dim stimuli obtained under such conditions differed much less than RTs obtained to bright and dim stimuli (intensity dissociation). Since RTs were obtained in those studies in tasks where stimuli appear only in one position, no attentional bias in favor of dim stimuli could occur in these RT tasks. Yet, one can expect an attentional bias in the TOJ task toward the position of the dim stimuli which might shorten their latencies. This difference was here proposed as an explanation of the intensity dissociation obtained in those studies.
Results of the reaction-time Experiments 1 and 2, where stimuli could appear at separate locations, strengthened the assumption that such a bias may indeed occur in TOJ tasks. However, we did not find any significant bias of attention in the TOJ task (measured by shift of psychometric functions). It did not matter for TOJ whether participants knew the position of the dim stimulus beforehand. This was true when participants had to decide whether the bright or dim stimulus was first (Experiment 3) as well as which of the bright stimuli was first, the one at the always-bright location or the one at bright-dim location (Experiment 4). The latter overall effect was equal to about 10 ms while for RT the effect with the identical asymmetry of intensities and with the same participants was equal to about 50 ms (Experiment 1). Thus, the attentional effect is task dependent, but in a way opposite to our hypothesis, being absent or at least much smaller for TOJ than for RT. Therefore, we have to conclude that the intensity dissociation between TOJ and RT cannot be explained by attentional bias for dim stimuli in the TOJ task. A similar result was obtained by Neumann, Esselmann, and Klotz (1993) , who found that RT underwent larger changes than TOJ if attention was manipulated by preceding cues. Thus, we have to infer from Neumann et al.'s (1993) and our present findings that TOJ is relatively immune against attentional bias, at least more than RT. This conclusion has some implications. On a pragmatic level, it raises the question of the usefulness of the TOJ task as an index of attentional shift, as used by Stelmach and Herdman (1991) and Stelmach, Campsall, and Herdman (1997) . On a more theoretical level, it raises the question about the mechanisms and reasons of this insensitivity. Therefore we discuss alternative accounts of the dissociations between RT and TOJ.
Alternative Accounts of the RT-TOJ Dissociations
Jaśkowski (1996, 1999) reviewed critically the hypotheses proposed to account for TOJ/RT dissociations. The results obtained by the present Experiments 3 and 4 falsify one of these hypotheses, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. At least two other hypotheses remain: the hypothesis of different time-markers and the hypothesis of dual routes.
The first hypothesis assumes that in RT and TOJ tasks participants consider quite
FIG. 5.
The hypothesis of different time-markers. This explanation of the intensity dissociation assumes that the motor response is started when the internal response crosses a criterion, while in TOJ participants use its maximum as a time marker. An internal response for high intensity crosses the criterion much earlier than an internal response for low intensity, but they reach maximal value almost simultaneously. different features of the internal response as time-markers; for example, its reaching a minimum threshold vs its maximal value (cf. Fig. 5 ). Two studies by Jaśkowski (1991 Jaśkowski ( , 1993 provide some evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Jaśkowski (1991) showed that both onset and offset of stimuli influence order judgment, whereas only stimulus onsets affect response times. Jaśkowski (1993) performed two experiments in which the time courses of auditory stimuli were manipulated by means of changing their rise and fall times. The results for PSS and RT differed strongly. Reaction time in both experiments behaved by and large according to predictions based on the idea of a response criterion which should be crossed by an internal response to start the motor activity. On the other hand, PSS changes seemed to follow the changes of peak or of the ''center of gravity'' of the time courses rather than reflect the changes of location of the points of threshold crossing. Thus, in the present case, activation induced by bright stimuli might have a steeper initial rise than with dim stimuli, so the threshold set by participants for triggering their response will be reached faster with bright stimuli, whereas after the initial steep rise both activations might take a similar time course, such that their ''center of gravity'' will become similar, making the point of subjective simultaneity rather insensitive to brightness differences. Indeed, such a reliance on different parameters of activation would be perfectly rational for participants in these tasks: When speed is relevant (RT task) the first sign of activation should be taken as trigger, whereas when accuracy is relevant (TOJ task) the sum of induced activation should be evaluated. Further, the present findings of effects of attentional bias can be incorporated in this framework: Attentional selection of stimuli makes sense in the RT task, to lower the threshold as much as possible to initiate the response, but does not make sense in the TOJ task where participants' aim is to make an unbiased estimate of temporal order.
The second hypothesis was proposed by Neumann (1990) . Emphasizing the fundamental difference between judgment and response, he argued that only judgment requires conscious perception while manual responding is directly specified by stimu-lation parameters. The term direct parameter specification ''refers to the hypothetical case that input information specifies action parameters without (or at least before) giving rise to a corresponding mental representation as a necessary prerequisite,'' while mental representation ''may be equated with perception'' (Neumann, 1990, p. 212) . Obviously, these two routes do not necessarily have to be identical in their dynamical properties. So, the different effects of, for example, stimulus intensity on TOJ and RT might be a simple consequence of this bifurcation.
Neumann's hypothesis was further tested in metacontrast experiments (Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & Neumann, 1999) . A dissociation occurs in these experiments between RT and judgment of stimulus presence/absence, similar to the dissociation between RT and TOJ. In their experiments, primes and masks had the same geometrical forms (diamonds and squares), primes being small copies of masks. In every trial, a pair of primes was followed by a pair of masks. The masks effectively prevented any identification of square vs diamond in the primes (see in particular Klotz & Neumann, 1999) , but nevertheless the primes had effects on RT. The response-relevant feature of the mask was position of the target stimulus, which was for different participants either square or diamond. So, if, for example, the target was the square and was presented as the left member of the pair of mask stimuli, a lefthand response was required. If already presented as member of the prime pair, the square had facilitating or detrimental effects on reaction time to the masking stimulus, depending on whether prime and mask were presented on the same side. These psychophysical findings received some support from electrophysiological studies. It was shown in this paradigm (Jaśkowski, van der Lubbe, Verleger, in preparation) as well as in similar ones (Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec'H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-Lambertz, van de Moortele, & Le Bihan, 1998) by recording the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), which most probably reflects activity of the two hand-motor cortices (Praamstra, Stegeman, Horstink, & Cools, 1986) , that unreportable prime stimuli start initial preparation of a manual response, which is further corrected by preparation of the response to the masking (imperative) stimulus. For example, if the prime calls for a response different from the one called by the masking stimulus, the improper hand is initially prepared. These are obviously arguments for the claim that, though not being identified, the prime can directly specify parameters for the reaction. Thus, by inference, these data also support the claim that RT and TOJ reflect processes that take place along different routes, with the RT route being more affected, for example, by intensity variations than the judgment route. On the other hand, it is not easy to understand by means of this distinction why RT proved sensitive to attentional factors in the present study while TOJ did not. If RT reflects a process that can be directly specified by stimulus occurrence, without conscious intervention, and if TOJ reflects a process of conscious judgment, then TOJ is expected to be more affected by attentional bias than RT, not less. Neumann et al. (1998) assumed that the directly specified reaction is mediated by the ''dorsal route'' of visual processing, while judgment needs conscious processing, which takes place in the ''ventral route.'' In fact, Aglioti, DeSouza, and Goodale (1995) and Haffenden and Goodale (1998) reported that the gap width formed by two fingers for grasping an object was not affected by an induced size illusion, in contrast to the gap width formed for displaying the estimated size of the same object.
These authors attributed this dissociation to different processing in the two routes, the dorsal one for motor behavior, the ventral one for object recognition. (Also in line with these considerations is the phenomenon of ''blindsight,'' i.e., that patients suffering from hemianopsia due to lesions of the primary visual cortex might be able to respond to stimuli they do not consciously perceive; Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; see Schärli, Harman, & Hogben, 1999 , for a recent critical evaluation.) If this were true (but see Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000 , for criticisms) the question becomes even more urgent why in the present data attentional bias did not affect the TOJ task, which may be supposed to be a ''ventral'' task (like size judgment), but did affect the RT task, which may be supposed to be a ''dorsal'' task (like grasping). Thus, the intuitively plausible parallel between judgment and movement on the one hand and ventral and dorsal route on the other hand meets with problems. Furthermore, more recently Neumann's group reported some evidence against the dual-route account. Ansorge et al. (1998) compared the metacontrast effect for manual and verbal reactions and found the same prime effect for both output modes. This finding contradicts Neumann et al.'s (1998) previous view that the metacontrast effect is a consequence of a branching (into dorsal and ventral path) taking place early in the visual system, as there is no evidence that verbal responses might be mediated by the dorsal stream.
Instead, Ansorge et al. (1998) suggested a ''late-dissociation'' hypothesis (see also Aschersleben, 1999) which assumes that there is only one stream of visual information from retina to conscious perception and that direct parameter specification occurs ''because the results of this single processing stream are available at different times, depending on whether a response or a judgment is required'' (p. 1186). Metacontrast masking takes place because the prime is ''erased'' by the mask after the (early) ''response'' stage and before the (late) ''judgment'' stage. In such a formulation, the ''late-dissociation'' hypothesis is identical or at least equivalent with the differenttime-markers hypothesis mentioned above. The only difference we see is that the different-time-markers hypothesis did not explicitly specify that temporal order judgment occurs at a later stage of processing, although one can argue that this is an obvious assumption. However, the Pulfrich stereophenomenon provides an argument for the view that early and late processing stages may use the same temporal information. This phenomenon arises when a target, oscillating horizontally in the frontoparallel plane, is viewed binocularly with a neutral filter before one eye (Pulfrich, 1922) . Under these conditions, the pendulum undergoes an apparent depth displacement and seems to rotate along an ellipse-type orbit, clockwise if the filter is placed in front of the left eye and counterclockwise if the filter is placed in front of the right eye. It is commonly accepted that the signals from the eye covered by the filter reach the brain later than those from the uncovered eye. Therefore, at any moment, the information about excitation due to target movement reaches the brain from noncorresponding points of the retinas. This gives binocular disparity and, consequently, stereopsis. Measuring subjective depth of the target, one can estimate the latency difference caused by reduction of stimulus intensity due to the filter covering one eye. It was shown that Pulfrich latency and simple reaction time dissociate similarly like TOJ and RT (Brauner & Lit, 1976; Williams & Lit, 1983) . One can argue that this is a nice example of the general judgment-versus-reaction dissociation. The problem is, however, that judgment in the Pulfrich effect is not based directly on time events but on stereopsis, which is known to be analyzed by the visual system very early (Poggio & Poggio, 1984) and to emerge automatically. But this might be an apparent problem only, where there is in fact a common regularity underlying the Pulfrich phenomenon and TOJ. It is quite possible that in the Pulfrich phenomenon centerof-gravity-like time-markers of the pendulum movement are extracted from the stream of neural activity in early visual processing to localize the pendulum in space (Morgan & Thompson, 1975; Morgan 1976 Morgan , 1977 . Therefore, the Pulfrich illusion in which rather early and automatic process uses temporal information in a way different from response times and very similar to TOJ tasks leads to the suggestion that the ''judgment stage'' in TOJ tasks is not necessarily a late stage of processing. Taken together, we would favor at present the different-time-markers hypothesis to account for the dissociations between RT and TOJ.
Cerebral Pathways for TOJ
Some clues on the processing differences between RT and TOJ would be gained if it became clear what regions of the brain are needed for performance of the TOJ task. At least three brain regions have been suggested to be relevant for TOJ. First, Von Steinbüchel, Wittmann, and Pöppel (1996) found that the thresholds for reliably defining the temporal order of two auditory stimuli were enhanced in aphasic patients with left-posterior lesions. This might be evidence either for a specific role of the left temporo-parietal cortex in distinguishing fast auditory input, related to its role in speech perception, or for a more general role in perceiving temporal order in all kinds of input modalities. Unfortunately, we do not know of patient studies in the CT era (to localize the lesion; some earlier studies are quoted in Penhune, Zatorre, & Evans, 1998 ) that test temporal order thresholds in other modalities than the auditory, so this question cannot be definitely decided. For the time being the assumption cannot be rejected that this is evidence for a specific input deficit with auditory input, not for a general role of the left-posterior cortex in temporal order judgment.
Two other brain structures discussed in the context of temporal information processing are the basal ganglia and the cerebellum. One source of evidence are studies in neurological patients: Patients both with cerebellar lesions (Ivry & Keele, 1989) and with underfunction of the basal ganglia due to Parkinson's disease (O'Boyle, Freeman, & Cody, 1996) were more variable than healthy subjects in imitating a presented rhythm and, more akin to TOJ, cerebellar patients performed worse in distinguishing between auditory intervals in the 100-to 600-ms range (Nichelli, Alway, & Grafman, 1996) . Again, the question may be asked whether these deficits indeed reflect a general role of the cerebellum or the basal ganglia in time estimation or whether the deficits reflect a specific role in processing auditory input, but the latter alternative seems to be rather far-fetched because neither clinical evidence (e.g., Schmahmann & Sherman, 1998; Thach, 1996; Dubois & Pillon, 1997) nor animal research (e.g., Houk, Buckingham, & Barto, 1996) suggests such a specific role in auditory processing. In line with these clinical studies, pharmacological studies with healthy participants showed that drug-induced blockade of dopamine receptors, simulating the lack of dopamine in Parkinson's disease, deteriorated processing of tempo-ral information (Rammsayer, 1997) . Another source of evidence are studies measuring the regional blood oxygenation in healthy subjects. In a recent fMRI study where participants had to discriminate visual or auditory rhythmic patterns, activation of many structures participating in motor activity was found, including parts of the basal ganglia and of the cerebellum (Schubotz, Friederici, & von Cramon, 2000) . Somewhat in contrast, in a PET study where participants had to reproduce complex or novel rhythms (Penhune et al., 1998) activation of the cerebellum was found independent of motor requirements, while activation of the basal ganglia appeared to depend more on implementation of the motor response. In both studies, activation increases were independent of the modality (visual or auditory) in which the rhythmic stimuli were presented. To summarize, both the cerebellum, or parts of it, and the basal ganglia may play a general role in timing. The results obtained by Nichelli et al. (1996) and Penhune et al. (1998) lead us to suggest that the cerebellum is somewhat more likely to be decisive in TOJ than the basal ganglia, but this question certainly has not been finally answered yet. Our suggestion is, of course, related to the emerging consensus in research on the cerebellum that this structure plays a general role in integrating sensory information necessary for predicting and preparing for events (e.g., Courchesne & Allen, 1997; Imamizu, Miyauchi, Tamada, Sasaki, Takino, Pütz, Yoshioka, & Kawato, 2000) . Thus, we may conclude by speculating that the cerebellum is the structure that has a main part in computing the ''center of gravity'' of the time course of stimuli and therefore is responsible for the stability of temporal order judgments against intensity changes and against attentional bias.
